Claiming
to represent what everyday Australians think about foreign
policy issues, the poll produced some incredible results.
Apparently Australian's perceive Islamic fundamentalism
and US foreign policy as equally concerning threats, while
China's growing power isn't. Fair enough, if you think
that the chance of Dubya pressing the 'N' button is as
likely as Osama launching another strike. Australians
also like China more than the United States and the majority
of people think an FTA with China is good, while believing
the US FTA is doing us no good. Ok, this can probably
be explained by the fact that we're presently making a
lot of money from China's hunger for our resources, and
those damn crazy Yanks dragged us into Iraq. However,
perhaps the piece de resistance of Chinese public relations
and the result that would have the Chinese embassy "ganbeiing"
copious amounts of rice wine well past midnight, is that
only 21% of those surveyed would support the US if it
went to war with China over Taiwan. It was results like
these that spawned headlines such as "Australians
view US as a threat to peace", "Australians
condemn US foreign policy", and "Aussies
rank US behind China". The results are certainly
sensational, but to draw any implications from them would
be too hasty. Apart from some flaws in the construction
of the survey, the results reflect a severe lack of understanding
into "The China story" and the current regional power
struggles in North'East Asia.
Greg
Sheridan and Gerard
Henderson have already questioned the construction
of some of the survey questions (Sheridan is particularly
scathing) and I do not wish to dwell on these sampling
flaws.
Instead,
I wish to show how the Australian population is presently
a little naïve and too sucked in by "The China story".
Right
now, everyone is enamoured with China. Not surprising
either. 9% GDP growth p.a. North'West Shelf billion dollar
gas deals. The Beijing Olympics. Hell, even my stockbroker
has jetted off to the Bamboo Curtain to get a feel for
"The China story". But this is the problem with all the
present coverage of China. It's all economics. The stuff
about regional security is usually found in some piece
deep in the middle of the Financial Review (and after
the headlines proclaimed another big China mining deal).
Let's get back to first principles. Peeling back China's
prodigious growth and the huge economic impact that it
will continue to have, China is still fundamentally an
authoritarian state. The "Communist" label is probably
a little thin these days ' check out Shanghai or any other
special economic zone. Perhaps more worrisome is that
nationalism has replaced communism, but more on this later.
The US, Japan and Australia are all democratic countries.
Is it reasonable for us to be more worried about a democratic
state, the US, than it is an authoritarian one which is
increasingly growing in stature?
On
the back of its economic success, China is starting to
assert itself. And not everything is rosy. On the military
side, China has already warned Australia to review a cornerstone
of Australia's security ' the ANZUS pact, if the Taiwan
war scenario was ever to play out. Economically, it looks
like China is our new best friend. The potential for a
China FTA has featured prominently. However China is actually
trying to use its diplomatic muscle to limit the amount
of involvement that Australia, along with India and Japan,
plays in any future dealings with ASEAN. China is worried
that its influence will be severely limited were India
and Japan also at the table. It is helpful to understand
how China views its rivals ' The US, Japan and India.
The
Chinese view of the US is paradoxical. Although it is
still a developing country, China views the US as its
chief rival. On the one hand, there is strong respect
(and perhaps awe), for US technology, military and pop
culture. Conversely, there is also a heavily ingrained
sense of racial superiority. It is common to hear the
Chinese line that:
"America only has two hundred years worth of history.
They do not know how to rule. We Chinese however, have
a six thousand year history."
While at a diplomatic and business level Chinese'US relations
appear quite strong, it is quite likely that the Pentagon
is very cautious about "The China story". Some hawks would
purportedly even like to see Taiwan independent. Naturally
a war over Taiwan is not an optimal outcome and a scenario
that would result in untold costs and consequences for
the region.
North'East
Asia is a tense region. North Korea and Kim Jong'Il aside,
Chinese'Japanese relations are terribly frosty. It is
not helped by either side. Questions about the accuracy
of Japanese history text books, President Koizumi's inflammatory
visits to the Yakashuni shrine and an infamous orgy of
Japanese businessmen and Chinese prostitutes on the anniversary
of the Nanjing Massacre are but some of the grievances
the Chinese have. Unsurprisingly, present Chinese attitudes
towards Japan are quite negative. While in Beijing, I
met quite a few six year olds who 'hated' Japan. When
asked why, they would say "I don't know, I just do." And
recent surveys back this up, with results showing greater
than 50% of respondents feeling unfriendly to Japan. The
internet has been widely used in the anti'Japanese crusade,
with a present petition spamming all around mainland China
asking people to oppose Japan's accession to the UN security
council. A separate email has rallied large groups of
protestors outside Japanese embassies in Beijing, Shanghai
and Guangzhou. In internet chat rooms it is common to
see very extreme (and quite disturbing) feelings. Some
Chinese youth feel that
"The only way to resolve this is through blood."
On
the other hand, the Chinese government has freely allowed
such feelings to fester. Japan has apologised to China
on no fewer than 17 occasions since the normalisation
of diplomatic relations in 1972. Furthermore, China for
a long time has been Japan's number one recipient of foreign
aid, receiving over US$1bn annually for a number of years
(which not surprising goes widely unreported in Chinese
media). Japan has effectively built a large part of China's
infrastructure. Indeed, the Japanese are the largest investors
in Beijing. But try telling any of this to a mainland
Chinese. They will not accept that any of this could at
all be true. When questioned, the Chinese will claim that
their negative view of the Japanese is justified, because
of past Japanese atrocities. More moderate Chinese will
say their gripe is with the Japanese government, not the
Japanese people. Unfortunately, recent events have shown
that this view is in the minority. Last year Japanese
football fans were attacked when Japan defeated China
in the Asia Cup Football final in Beijing, while over
the weekend, projectiles were thrown at Japanese embassies,
department stores and restaurants and a Japanese diplomatic
car was torched. One only hopes that restraint will be
exercised during the Beijing Olympics. Ominously, the
relationship between these two North'East Asian giants
doesn't look like cooling in the short term. With China's
pursuit of a space program (when over 60% of the population
is still poor), Japan is rightly questioning why they
should continue to provide aid.
Taiwan
is also a thorn in relations. Taiwan is a reminder of
Japanese imperialism ' it was a colony of Japan's until
World War II. Recently, in a provoking gesture, Japan
granted a visa to Lee Teng-Hui, the pro-separatist, former
President of Taiwan (and a mortal enemy of the mainland).
China is also concerned that Japan, who jointly called
for caution over the Taiwan question with the US, will
help the US defend Taiwan.
The
US and Japan are in some ways 'aspirational' rivals of
China, as they are seen as the benchmark. India, a country
with an equally massive population, is often viewed by
more realistic Chinese as a better comparison. The similarities
and differences of these neighbours are too vast for this
article, but key issues will suffice ' China is communist.
India is democratic. China's press is controlled and is
a closed society. India is a much more open society. China
has a strong IT manufacturing base. India is a world'leading
software hub.
China
presently has the economic advantage, pursuing liberalising
economic reforms much faster than India, but India is
catching up. India wants the economic and military cred
that China is currently enjoying, and this may not be
far off. Firstly, the world is starting to wake up to
India's potential, but more importantly, India will
likely play a more strategic role primarily because
of its democratic tradition and to a lesser extent,
its English speaking population. A classic example was
the Boxing Day tsunami. Circumventing the inefficiency
of the UN, the US, Japan, Australia and India (and not
China), were able to quickly form a response group to
coordinate planning. The tsunami tragedy illustrated
two things ' India is considered part of the US "in"
group, and while the outpouring from the Chinese in
Beijing was heartfelt (mind you, the Chinese people
had to be told by their government to feel sympathetic),
China's modest aid package illustrates her limits. It
is a widely held view that the US will increasingly
support India, so that India and Japan are effective
counterweights to China's rise. Australia has also engaged
in this geo'strategic chess game ' the recent deployment
of Australian troops to Iraq was to protect the Japanese.
So all of this links back to why China is trying hard
to prevent closer Australian, Indian and Japanese ties
with ASEAN.
Perhaps
the most disturbing trend is the rise of Chinese nationalism.
The Chinese government is aware that while capitalism
will make more people rich, dissatisfaction will rise,
especially for those that miss out on the benefits.
This has essentially been the history of China ' how
to manage a huge country with sharp regional contrasts
and keep the people from revolting. This theme of history
reared its head at Tiananmen in 1989, and has been a
constant even in the last few years, particularly in
towns where mining disasters have occurred. Mindful
of dissatisfaction, the government's strategy is to
ensure that blame is not directed at them, but anything
else. In doing so, the government is pursuing a policy
of showing off achievements, such as the space program,
on very much a nationalistic agenda. Government controlled
papers run daily articles on reunifying Taiwan, with
strong 'mother country' overtones. Allowing anti-Japanese
sentiment to flourish (such as the 20,000 who recently
protested, when protests are usually banned) is another
aspect of this approach ' people are not happy with
their lot, so let them blame the Japanese while showing
them how great the Chinese people are. Where will this
nationalism lead to? One hopes that this does not result
in blinding patriotism that clouds reasoned judgement.
Finally,
it should be noted that the Chinese government is still
not totally in tune with international opinion. In his
fictitious work The Bear and the Dragon, Tom Clancy
portrays a China run by communist ideologues who think
that the West only worries about money, even to the
extent of ignoring a war which China starts. However,
the West does react and steps in. While the real Chinese
Communist Party is much more commercial and these days
less ideological than in Clancy's book, there are some
strikingly similar themes to recent events. The passing
of the anti'secession law allowing the Chinese government
to legally attack Taiwan probably was judged by the
Chinese leadership to be of no concern to the West.
However it has been cited as a reason for the EU's hesitation
in lifting a 16 year arms embargo following Tiananmen.
In a way, it has also woken up the world to the other
side of "The China story". It's not just the economy,
stupid.
*
For more on Chinese nationalism, see Matt
Plowright's article in the March 2005 issue of The
Backbench.
Kevin
Yeoh is back at the bank after spending every day
in China bargaining for any and every commodity. Four
out of five people still shun him at parties.
This
article first appeared on The
Backbench. All Rights Reserved The Backbench 2005
